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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Under the American legal regime, criminal sanctions may 
only be imposed where expressly allowed by law. However, there 
are gaps in the law. Circumstances often arise which are not 
covered by criminal statute, but merit some level of punishment. 
Consider this scenario: a seventy-seven year old patient suffering 
from advanced Alzheimer’s disease is placed in a nursing home 
after being hospitalized with pneumonia.1 “The patient is 
bedridden, incontinent, and his limbs [are] contracted.”2 Upon his 
admission, the nursing home staff observes a very large, dark red 
area around his buttocks that is identified as a Stage I or II 
bedsore.3 The staff fails to take the appropriate action to treat the 
sore and, as a result, the condition worsens to a Stage III bedsore, 
which broke open after eleven days.4 The patient is finally 
removed from the care facility and hospitalized. By the time a 
doctor examines the patient, the bedsore has deteriorated to Stage 
IV, which means that the man’s bones are exposed.5 The patient 
files suit, alleging that the caregivers were grossly negligent in 
their failure to properly treat the bedsore.6 The caregivers’ grossly 
negligent conduct is unlikely to result in criminal sanction. It falls 
within a gap in the legal regime; a gray area in which punishment 
                                                                                                             
 1. See Convalescent Services, Inc. v. Schultz, 921 S.W.2d 731, 733–34 
(Tex. App. 14th. Dist. 1996) (This factual hypothetical was taken from a case 
heard by a Texas court, in which the court held the defendants grossly 
negligent). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. (when a bedsore has progressed to this point, the skin breaks open 
and the sore becomes an open wound).  
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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and deterrence is merited, but not provided for by law. Allowing 
the recovery of punitive damages for grossly negligent behavior 
allows for courts to fill these gaps in the law. 
The concept of gross negligence is a highly malleable, ill-
defined legal concept that falls somewhere on a scale between 
negligent and intentional conduct.7 It is generally defined as 
conduct that can be considered more blameworthy than simple 
negligence, but less blameworthy than intent.8 While it’s generally 
accepted that gross negligence, willful, wanton and reckless 
conduct is an aggravated form of negligence, courts and scholars 
have had difficulty giving any firm definition to the concept.9 
Prosser and Keeton have discussed gross negligence, and the 
difficulties associated therewith, at length. According to them, the 
terms “willful, wanton and reckless” have been applied to that 
degree of fault which lies “between intent to do harm . . . and the 
mere reasonable risk of harm involved in ordinary negligence”:10 
They apply to conduct, which is still merely negligent 
rather than actually intended to do harm, but which is so far 
from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many 
respects as if harm was intended . . . . The usual meaning 
assigned to [these terms] . . . is that the actor has 
intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in 
disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to 
make it highly probable that harm would follow, and which 
thus is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference to 
the consequences.11 
                                                                                                             
 7. FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., LOUISIANA TORT 
LAW § 1.06 (2d ed., LexisNexis 2009). 
 8. Id. 
 9. PROSSER & KEETON, ON THE LAW OF TORTS 209–11 (5th ed., W. 
Page Keeton et all. eds., West 1984) (Some scholars have tried to place gross 
negligence, willful, wanton, and reckless conduct at separate points on the scale 
of negligence and create a scheme in which each term describes a different form 
of conduct with varying degrees of liability. However, because this is such an 
unworkable scheme, most courts and scholars consider these phrases 
synonymous; all describing the same general type of conduct that can be 
considered more blameworthy than simple negligence, but less blameworthy 
than intent). 
 10. Id. at 212.  
 11. Id. at 212-13. 
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Louisiana courts have joined the collective cry and lamented 
the lack of clarity surrounding gross negligence.12 In Rosenblath’s, 
Inc. v. Bakers Industries, Inc., the Louisiana Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals sought to distill a workable definition of gross 
negligence.13 The court discussed a number of Louisiana statutes 
that provide varying definitions of gross negligence.14 From its 
statutory consideration the court concluded that the legislature 
intended to define gross negligence as a reckless disregard, or 
carless indifference, which may involve a gross or substantial 
deviation from an expected standard of care.15 The court then 
moved on to judicial interpretations that yielded an even more 
muddled definition than that distilled from statute.16 From previous 
interpretations, the court found that gross negligence falls 
generally between negligence and intent.17 The court went on to 
conclude that Louisiana, through statutes and jurisprudence, 
generally defines gross negligence as conduct that falls below what 
is expected of a reasonably careful person under like 
circumstances, or less diligence than even a careless man is 
accustomed to exercise.18  
Both the Louisiana bijural system and the majority of common 
law jurisdictions have arrived at a working theory of gross 
negligence as an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of 
care, which even a careless man would exercise, with complete 
disregard for the consequences of those actions.19 Although their 
definitions are similar, Louisiana’s application of the gross 
negligence standard is remarkably different from that applied in 
                                                                                                             
 12. Rosenblath’s, Inc. v. Baker Industries, Inc., 634 So. 2d 969, 972 (La. 
App. 2d Cir. 1994). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 973 (The court went further to say that gross negligence is a 
reckless disregard or careless indifference and may involve a gross or substantial 
deviation from an expected or defined standard of care). 
 19. See id. at 972–3; KEETON, supra note 9, at 211–12. 
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her sister states. The common law employs gross negligence in a 
more aggressive fashion, allowing its use as an offensive weapon 
to create greater liability and allow recovery of punitive 
damages.20 In Louisiana, gross negligence is primarily used in the 
context of the defense of immunity, when legislation promotes 
public policy by limiting liability for certain actors. 
This article focuses on the traditional areas of development of 
gross negligence in tort law (immunities, contributory negligence, 
and punitive damages)21 and compares the practical application of 
the concept in Louisiana with its application in other common law 
jurisdictions. Although in many respects gross negligence operates 
in the same fashion regardless of the jurisdiction, there is one 
major point of distinction: Louisiana has chosen to limit the 
offensive utility of gross negligence by severely curtailing the 
availability of punitive damages. In so doing, Louisiana has chosen 
to focus on the use of gross negligence in the context of 
immunities, in order to raise the threshold of liability for certain 
actors. 
Section II of this essay considers the historical development of 
gross negligence and its arrival into American and, more 
specifically, Louisiana law. Sections III and IV consider the 
application of gross negligence, in both common law jurisdictions 
and in Louisiana. Finally, after an examination of the distinctions 
in application in Louisiana and other common law jurisdictions, 
this essay argues that Louisiana should incorporate the common 
law application of gross negligence and punitive damages into its 
legal system to fill the gap between criminal and civil law. 
                                                                                                             
 20. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 491-93 (2008). Nebraska 
does not apply punitive damages under any circumstances. Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Washington, and New Hampshire only allow recovery of 
punitive damage under certain limited circumstances prescribed by statute. 
 21. This essay focuses on the use of gross negligence in its traditional areas 
of tort development: immunities, punitive damages, and contributory 
negligence. Gross negligence is also applied to other areas of the law including 
contractual indemnity and workers compensation; however, these applications 
will not be addressed here. 
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II. LOOKING BACK: THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF GROSS 
NEGLIGENCE 
The concept of varying degrees of negligence has its origin in 
Roman law.22 Under the Roman scheme, there were three levels of 
negligence: culpa lata, gross negligence; culpa levis, ordinary 
negligence; and culpa levissima, slight negligence.23 Although 
gross negligence in the common law and in Louisiana both trace 
their roots back to this original Roman concept, the theory made its 
way into each system through very different routes.24 
A. Bringing Gross Negligence into American Jurisprudence 
Gross negligence made its way into American jurisprudence by 
way of the English writ system25 from which the modern American 
common law developed.26 Under the writ system, tort law 
developed on a case-by-case basis, as the need arose. Gross 
negligence entered the English common law in 1704 in Coggs v. 
Bernard.27 Chief Justice Hold of the Kings Bench saw the need to 
establish varying degrees of fault in dealing with bailment cases.28 
To establish this system, he looked to the Roman tradition and 
adopted its concepts of gross negligence, ordinary negligence, and 
slight negligence.29 
American jurisprudence adopted the Coggs approach in 1822 
with Tracy v. Wood.30 Justice Story adopted gross negligence in 
                                                                                                             
 22. Patrick H. Martin, The BP Spill and the Meaning of “Gross 
Negligence or Willful Misconduct”, 71 LA. L. REV. 957, 977–78 (2011). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: 
TORT LAW 2–3 (2d ed., West 2009); Martin, supra note 22, at 977–78. 
 25. On the writ system, see EDGAR BODENHEIMER ET AL., AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: READINGS AND 
CASES 26 (4th ed., West 2004). 
 26. Id. 
 27. (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B); 2 Ld. Raym. 909. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Martin, supra note 22, at 1007. 
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Tracy as a means of limiting the liability for gratuitous bailees.31 
Since Tracy, the American judiciary has developed gross 
negligence in relation to three different areas of tort law: punitive 
damages, contributory negligence, and immunity statutes.32 Under 
the modern common law approach, gross negligence can be used 
to justify an award of punitive damages, to overcome contributory 
negligence as a bar to a plaintiff’s recovery, and to limit the 
liability of certain actors with legislative immunity statutes. 
B. The Louisiana Perspective 
Louisiana’s civilian tort theory traces its origins directly to 
Roman law through the laws of France and the laws of Spain, 
applicable during the colonial period. The civil law notion of 
obligation is derived from Roman law, which defined an obligation 
as a vinculum juris, or bond of law, which obliges a person to do or 
to refrain from doing something.33 The Roman law of delict was 
based on a simple overarching principle: “A man must see that he 
does not willfully invade another’s right, or in breach of a duty, 
willfully or carelessly cause him pecuniary loss. If he does either 
of these things, he is answerable in damages.”34 It was under this 
Roman theory of tort law that separate levels of negligence first 
developed.35 
Roman law found its way into Louisiana through French and 
Spanish laws.36 Antoine Crozat was granted a charter to develop 
Louisiana in the name of France in 1712.37 The charter provided 
that the Coutume de Paris, along with all Royal Ordinances and 
                                                                                                             
 31. Tracy v. Wood, 24 F. Cas. 117 (C.C.D.R.I. 1822). 
 32. See Martin, supra note 22, at 992-1014. 
 33. See CRAWFORD, supra note 24, at 2.  
 34. Id. at 5 (this principle found its way into many modern civil codes, 
including the Louisiana Civil Code). 
 35. Martin, supra note 21, at 977–978. See also, discussion supra Part 
I.A (In Roman law, there were three levels of negligence: culpa lata (gross 
negligence), culpa levis (ordinary negligence), and culpa levissima (slight 
negligence)). 
 36. See CRAWFORD, supra note 24, at 10-11. 
 37. Id. at 8. 
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Edicts, would govern the territory.38 This form of French law 
remained in effect until 1769, when Louisiana came under Spanish 
rule.39 The transition from French to Spanish rule meant that, at 
least theoretically, Roman law, as received in Spain and codified in 
Las Siete Partidas, governed the Louisiana territory until 1808.40 
In 1808, the legislature of the Territory of Orleans tasked James 
Brown and Louis Moreau-Lislet with collecting and codifying the 
civil laws of the Territory, as Spanish law had been maintained 
after the Louisiana Purchase.41 Moreau-Lislet and Brown produced 
the Digest of 1808, which the Legislative Council adopted on 
March 31, 1808.42 There has been a great deal of debate over 
whether the Digest of 1808 was based on the Code Napoléon of 
France or Las Siete Partidas of Spain.43 Regardless of which 
source the Digest of 1808 more closely resembles, both the Code 
Napoléon and Las Siete Partidas find their roots in the Roman 
tradition. 
Under modern civilian theory, legislation is the law and is to be 
treated as the solemn will of the legislature.44 Judicial opinion is 
nothing more than the interpretation of the law.45 However, 
because the code articles governing delicts are very limited, 
Louisiana courts have been forced to write the majority of tort law 
under the guise of interpretation.46 Louisiana courts have thus 
developed the state’s modern tort law, including the concept of 
                                                                                                             
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 10. 
 40. Id. at 7, 10. 
 41. Id. at 10-11. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2 (2010) (“Legislation is a solemn expression 
of legislative will”). 
 45. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (2010) (“The sources of law are legislation 
and custom”). 
 46. Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1156 (La. 1988) (“The 
framers conceived of fault as a breach of a preexisting obligation, for which the 
law orders reparation, when it causes damage to another, and they left it to the 
court to determine in each case the existence of an anterior obligation which 
would make an act constitute fault”). 
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gross negligence. Like the common law, Louisiana adopted gross 
negligence from the Roman law and then developed the concept 
through jurisprudence, focusing on punitive damages, contributory 
negligence, and immunity statutes, just as in the common law 
states. 
III. GROSS NEGLIGENCE IN THE COMMON LAW 
After the adoption of gross negligence into American 
jurisprudence in 1822, the judiciary began to develop the concept 
in the context of punitive damages, contributory fault, and 
immunity statutes.47 Punitive damages are employed to punish 
certain behavior just as immunities are employed by the legislature 
to promote certain behavior.48 On the one hand, a plaintiff is 
allowed to recover punitive damages upon a showing of gross 
negligence while on the other, legislatures use gross negligence as 
a limit to the defense of immunity, allowing the plaintiff to recover 
when establishing that the defendant has been grossly negligent. 
A. Gross Negligence and Punitive Damages in the American 
Common Law 
The idea of punishment as a civil mechanism can be traced 
back to a number of ancient legal systems, including the Twelve 
Tables—the original codification of ancient Roman law.49 The 
English common law adopted the concept of extra damages to 
punish reprehensible conduct in the 1763 case of Wilkes v. Wood.50 
In Wilkes, the court granted an award for “more than the injury 
received” against the Secretary of State for conducting an unlawful 
                                                                                                             
 47. See Martin, supra note 22, at 1007. 
 48. See BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (The 
Supreme Court recognized that states have a legitimate interest in protecting 
their citizens from extra blameworthy behavior and affirmed the use of punitive 
damages to punish the actor and deter future conduct of a similar nature). 
 49. John W. deGravelles, J. Neale deGravelles, Louisiana Punitive 
Damages—A Conflict of Traditions, 70 LA. L. REV. 579, 580 (2010). 
 50. Id. at 581. 
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search of the plaintiff’s papers.51 Afterwards, the English courts 
began to routinely grant awards in excess of a plaintiff’s actual 
damages when the defendant’s actions merited punishment.52 
In 1784, punitive damages crossed the Atlantic and entered 
American case law in Genay v. Norris.53 Since the adoption of 
punitive damages into American law, the Supreme Court has 
evaluated the appropriate use of the concept. In BMW of North 
America v. Gore, the Court observed that some wrongs are more 
blameworthy than others.54 The Court affirmed that states have a 
legitimate interest in protecting their citizens from extraordinarily 
blameworthy behavior by allowing punitive damages, which the 
Justices reasoned would serve to punish the actor and function as a 
deterrent of future behavior of a similar nature.55 In a later 
decision, the Court was forced to address exactly what type of 
conduct was worthy of civil punishment.56 The Court determined 
that punitive damages should only be used to punish a defendant 
who was guilty of outrageous conduct, and affirmed the traditional 
notion that gross negligence was the threshold for punitive 
damages liability.57 Many states have chosen to follow the 
Supreme Court’s example.58 Nevertheless, the availability of 
punitive damages varies on a state-by-state basis.59 This being 
said, most states will allow the plaintiff to recover punitive 
damages upon a showing of gross negligence.60 In fact, this 
application has become so entrenched in the American judicial 
                                                                                                             
 51. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, (K.B.) 498. 
 52. Huckle v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768, (K.B.) 768-69. 
 53. Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 410 (2009) (citing 
Genay v. Norris, 1 S. C. L. 6, 7, 1784 WL 26 (C. P. and Gen. Sess. (1784)). 
 54. 517 U.S. 559, 575–76 (1996). 
 55. See id. at 569. 
 56. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 493 (2008). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. at 492–94.  
 59. Id. at 494. (Nebraska does not apply punitive damages under any 
circumstances. Louisiana, Massachusetts, Washington, and New Hampshire 
only allow recovery of punitive damage under certain limited circumstances 
prescribed by statute). 
 60. Martin, supra note 22, at 994. 
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mind that the Seventh Circuit has speculated that the primary 
function of gross negligence is to justify an award of punitive 
damages.61 
Georgia and New York are representative of the common law 
approach to punitive damages and gross negligence.62 Georgia 
employs a statutory regime that governs the application of gross 
negligence and punitive damages,63 while in contrast, punitive 
damages in New York are governed exclusively by case law.64 A 
consideration of the application of gross negligence to punitive 
damages in Georgia and New York is illustrative of the broader 
common law approach. 
1. Punitive Damages under Georgia Law 
The availability of punitive damages in Georgia is governed by 
statute. State law allows the recovery of punitive damages where 
the plaintiff can establish that the defendant’s actions showed 
“willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that 
entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a 
conscious indifference to consequences.”65 Under Georgia law, 
punitive damages are primarily used to deter similar conduct in the 
future by punishing a guilty actor in the present.66 If the court finds 
a defendant to be merely negligent, then damages are limited to the 
amount necessary to make the plaintiff whole.67 Punitive damages 
                                                                                                             
 61. Kelly v. Malott, 135 F. 74 (7th Cir. 1905). 
 62. Both Georgia and New York set the minimum threshold for punitive 
damages at gross negligence. 
 63. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5(a) (LexisNexis 2011); Kicklighter v. Nails by 
Jannee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 64. See Welch v. Mr. Christmas, Inc., 440 N.E.2d 1317 (1982). 
 65. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 66. WMH, Inc. v. Thomas, 398 S.E.2d 196, 198 (Ga. 1990) (the court 
insisted that the primary goal of punitive damages is deterrence, and a jury 
award which had the sole purpose of punishing wrongful behavior cannot be 
upheld). 
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are only recoverable when the defendant’s conduct is worthy of 
deterrence.68 
Under this standard, a Georgia court awarded punitive damages 
in Comcast Corporation et al. v. Warren.69 The plaintiff in this 
case sustained severe injuries in an automobile accident when the 
defendant’s employees failed to properly warn of an obstruction 
they had created in the roadway.70 After coming to an immediate 
stop to avoid the obstruction, Mr. Warren was struck in the rear by 
another vehicle.71 The jury awarded Mr. Warren $280,000 in 
compensatory damages and $720,000 in punitive damages.72 The 
trial court subsequently reduced the award of punitive damages to 
$250,000, to bring the award amount within the appropriate 
statutory guidelines.73 On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals 
considered the scenario and determined that the employees of 
Comcast had behaved “negligently, recklessly, wantonly, and with 
a conscious disregard for the consequences” of their actions in 
their failure to warn of the obstruction they had created.74 If the 
court had determined that the defendants were merely negligent, 
the plaintiffs would have been limited to compensatory damages.75 
But, because the court concluded that the defendants were grossly 
negligent, punitive damages were appropriate.76  
2. Punitive Damages under New York Law 
In contrast to Georgia, punitive damages in New York are 
governed primarily by case law. Under the New York standard, 
punitive damages are to be employed to punish the defendant for 
                                                                                                             
 68. Id. 
 69. 650 S.E.2d 307 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). 
 70. Id. at 309. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 312–13. 
 75. Molton v. Commercial Credit Corp., 193 S.E.2d 629, 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1972). 
 76. Id. 
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his conduct and to deter similar future behavior.77 To sustain a 
claim for punitive damages, the plaintiff must show that his or her 
damages were the result of “intentional or deliberate wrongdoing, 
aggravating or outrageous circumstances, a fraudulent or evil 
motive, or a conscious act that willfully and wantonly disregards 
the rights of others.”78 If the plaintiff can establish one of these 
aggravating factors, punitive damages may be awarded.79 
Under this standard, the Supreme Court of New York’s Kings 
County upheld an award of punitive damages in Hall v. 
Consolidated Edison Corporation.80 In Hall, Consolidated Edison 
employees entered a building on a Friday afternoon under the 
pretense of being elevator repairmen.81 Once inside, the employees 
shut off electrical service to the common hallways and elevators of 
the apartment building, which held over 500 tenants.82 The 
plaintiff, attempting to care for elderly and bedridden patients, 
slipped on wax drippings in a darkened stairway and sustained 
injuries from a fall.83 The jury returned a verdict of gross 
negligence and awarded punitive damages in the amount of 
$5,000,000.84 On appeal the court upheld the lower court’s finding 
of gross negligence and the award of punitive damages, but 
reduced the amount of damages awarded by the jury.85 
3. A Final Look at Punitive Damages 
In the end, punitive damages are only awarded when the 
actions of the defendant go far beyond the pale of reasonable 
conduct. In 2005, punitive damages were only pled in an estimated 
                                                                                                             
 77. Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1978). 
 78. Don Buchwald & Assocs. v. Rich, 723 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2001). 
 79. See Le Mistral, Inc., 402 N.Y.S.2d at 817–18. 
 80. Hall v. Consol. Edison Corp., 428 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y. 1980). 
 81. Id. at 842. 
 82. Id. at 838. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 838–39. 
 85. Id. at 842–43. 
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twelve percent of state court trials nationwide,86 and awarded in 
only five percent of all cases where the plaintiff won.87 As these 
statistics indicate, courts reserve punitive damage awards for the 
limited circumstances where punishment is merited and deterrence 
is necessary.88 Most states consider gross negligence as meriting 
punishment. In the majority of common law states, just as in New 
York and Georgia, grossly negligent behavior will give the 
plaintiff an opportunity to pursue an award of punitive damages. 
B. Contributory Negligence in the Common Law 
A second historical application of gross negligence has been in 
the realm of contributory negligence.89 Under the theory of 
contributory negligence, any conduct on the part of the plaintiff, 
which contributes to his injuries, bars the plaintiff from recovery.90 
Many courts were dissatisfied with the traditional contributory 
negligence rule, but were unable to abolish it without stepping into 
the shoes of the legislature.91 Instead, the courts developed gross 
negligence as a means of overcoming contributory negligence as a 
bar to the plaintiff’s recovery.92 Courts concluded that wherever it 
appeared that the plaintiff’s negligence was comparatively slight 
and the defendant was guilty of gross negligence, the plaintiff 
should not be denied recovery.93  
Recognizing the harsh nature of contributory negligence, most 
states have moved toward some form of comparative fault.94 Under 
                                                                                                             
 86. Thomas H. Cohen & Kyle Harbacek, U.S. Department of Justice, 
Special Report: Punitive Damage Awards in State Courts, 2005 (March 
2011), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo35184/pdasc05.pdf. 
 87. Id. at 4. 
 88. BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (U.S. 1996). 
 89. Martin, supra note 22, at 1002. 
 90. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Cal. 1975). 
 91. Martin, supra note 22, at 1002. 
 92. Comment, Negligence: Exceptions to the Rule that Contributory 
Negligence Is a Defense: Gross Negligence, 17 CAL. L. REV. 65, 66 (1928).  
 93. Id. 
 94. North Carolina’s Contributory Negligence Rules Outdated and Unfair, 
Disabled World (August 13, 2010), www.disabledworld.com/news/america/nc 
/negligence-laws.php (last visited Jul. 30, 2013). 
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a pure comparative fault scheme, liability is apportioned according 
to fault.95 For example, if the plaintiff is ninety percent at fault and 
the defendant only ten percent, the plaintiff is still entitled to 
recover ten percent of his damages from the defendant.96 In 
contrast, under an ordinary comparative fault scheme, liability is 
apportioned up to the point at which the plaintiff’s fault is greater 
than or equal to that of the defendant’s.97 Under an ordinary 
comparative fault scheme, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for his 
or her damages up until the point at which he or she is forty-nine 
percent at fault, and the defendant fifty-one percent at fault.98 If it 
reaches the point where the plaintiff is fifty percent or more at 
fault, recovery is barred.99 Thirteen states have a pure comparative 
fault scheme and thirty-three states have chosen to follow an 
ordinary comparative fault scheme.100 Only four have chosen to 
continue applying contributory negligence.101 
The decline of contributory negligence has lessened the need 
for courts to use gross negligence as a means of awarding damages 
despite a plaintiff’s negligence. However, in the few jurisdictions 
that continue to apply the doctrine of contributory negligence, 
gross negligence can still be used to circumvent a bar to recovery. 
For example, under North Carolina law, contributory negligence 
still serves as a bar to recovery and gross negligence is still used as 
a means of overcoming it.102 
C. Immunity Statutes in the Common Law 
                                                                                                             
 95. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242–43 (Cal. 1975). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. North Carolina’s Contributory Negligence Rules Outdated and Unfair, 
supra note 96. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Yancey v. Lea, 550 S.E.2d 155, 157 (N.C. 2001) (The court accepted 
the jury’s finding that negligence on the part of both the plaintiff and defendant 
were a cause of the plaintiff’s injuries and denied the plaintiff’s recovery on the 
grounds of contributory fault). 
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A third significant source of development of gross negligence 
has been its use in conjunction with immunity statutes.103 Many 
scholars believe the use of gross negligence to overcome immunity 
statutes is best seen as an “escape route” that allows a court to 
avoid the absurd results that could be reached with unqualified 
immunity.104 Professor Fredrick Schauer proposed that: 
Legal systems must provide some escape route from the 
occasional absurdity generated by literal application 
because applying the literal meaning of a rule can at times 
produce a result which is plainly silly, clearly at odds with 
the purpose behind the regulation, or clearly inconsistent 
with any conception of wise policy.105 
Using gross negligence in conjunction with immunity statutes 
provides a heightened threshold of liability for a defendant; 
however, it also allows courts the option of permitting the plaintiff 
to recover when the defendant’s actions are of such a nature that to 
deny damages would be absurd.106 
Traditionally, legislatures have granted broad immunity to 
actors whose conduct is considered valuable to society.107 These 
statutes are enacted under the theory that, while the defendant may 
be a wrongdoer, there is greater social utility derived from 
protecting him than in making an injured plaintiff whole.108 
Therefore, when legislatures view an actor’s activity as beneficial 
to society, they may wish to protect that actor by limiting his or her 
liability in tort action.109  
Immunity statutes provide an affirmative defense to certain 
tortious conduct.110 Most states do not provide unqualified 
immunity for privileged actors.111 Rather, they raise the threshold 
                                                                                                             
 103. Martin, supra note 22, at 1006. 
 104. Id. at 1007. 
 105. Fredrick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L.J. 509, 525 (1988). 
 106. Martin, supra note 22, at 1007. 
 107. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 1032. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Martin, supra note 22, at 1007. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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of their liability from negligence to gross negligence.112 Plaintiffs 
have to prove that the otherwise-immune defendants were grossly 
negligent for recovery to be available. 
Although there is some variation from state to state, almost all 
common law jurisdictions employ governmental immunity 
statutes, automotive guest statutes, recreational activity statutes, 
and Good Samaritan legislation.113 The recreational land use 
statute is one of the most common immunity statutes in effect.114 It 
encourages landowners to open their property for public 
recreational use, free of charge, by limiting the owner’s liability for 
accidents that occur on the property.115  
Georgia’s recreational land use law illustrates how common 
law immunity statutes operate to promote the governmental goal of 
encouraging certain behavior by limiting an actor’s liability for 
injuries that may occur on the property.116 Under Georgia law, a 
land owner generally owes no duty to keep his or her property safe 
for recreational users;117 however, the owner will be liable for 
injuries if he or she was grossly negligent in failing to warn or 
guard against a dangerous condition, use, or activity.118 
A Georgia court addressed the state’s recreational use laws in 
Spivey v. City of Baxley.119 The plaintiff brought suit for injuries 
sustained while attending a softball game at a field maintained by 
the County Recreation Board.120 Mrs. Spivey alleged that she fell 
after stepping from a concrete slab covering a drainage ditch.121 
                                                                                                             
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See The University of Vermont, Recreational Use Statues, 
http://asci.uvm.edu/equine/law/recreate/recreate.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
 115. Id. 
 116. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-3-20 (LexisNexis 2011) (Georgia takes a 
traditional, middle-of-the-road view of gross negligence. The way the state’s 
legal regime employs the concept in punitive damages and immunity statutes is 
representative of how other common law jurisdictions treat gross negligence.). 
 117. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-3-22 (LexisNexis 2011). 
 118. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-3-25 (LexisNexis 2011). 
 119. 437 S.E.2d 623 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). 
 120. Id. at 624. 
 121. Id. 
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She maintained that her injuries were a result of the defendant’s 
failure to correct a dangerous condition existing on the property.122 
In answer to Mrs. Spivey’s claims, the defendant asserted its 
immunity under Georgia’s recreational land use statute.123 
The court recognized that, under Georgia law, a defendant who 
allows free access to the property can only be held liable if the 
plaintiff established that the defendant’s actions showed a “willful 
failure to guard or warn.”124 The court stated that for the defendant 
to be found grossly negligent, he or she must have knowledge that 
a condition which posed an unreasonable risk of death or serious 
bodily harm existed, that the condition was not apparent to those 
using the property, and that the owner chose not to guard or warn 
against the danger in disregard of the consequences.125 
The Spivey court considered that, while Georgia’s recreation 
land use statute did not expressly include spectators at athletic 
events, the purpose of the statute clearly encompassed this sort of 
use; therefore, the recreational land use statute was applicable.126 
The court concluded that the defendant was not guilty of grossly 
negligent conduct and could not be held liable.127 
As the Georgia land use statute illustrates, immunity statutes 
operate as an affirmative defense by allowing a negligent plaintiff 
to escape liability. Had a state immunity statute not covered the 
landowner in Spivey, it would have been liable to the plaintiff for 
negligently failing to warn of the obstruction. However, because 
the immunity statute was in play, the landowner was able to plead 
as a defense that, because he was not grossly negligent, he could 
not be held liable.  
Immunity statutes are employed by the legislature to encourage 
certain behavior just as punitive damages are awarded to 
                                                                                                             
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 625. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 625–26. 
 127. Id. at 626. 
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discourage certain behavior. Immunities raise the threshold of 
liability from negligence to gross negligence. If an immunity 
statute covers the defendant, he or she will escape liability if the 
plaintiff is unable to prove that the defendant was grossly 
negligent. This applies in Louisiana in the same manner as in 
common law states. 
IV. THE LOUISIANA APPROACH TO GROSS NEGLIGENCE 
Like the common law, Louisiana’s law of gross negligence 
traces its origins to the Roman legal system.128 Similarly, the 
framework of Louisiana’s gross negligence law was generally 
developed in the context of punitive damages, contributory 
negligence, and immunity statutes.129 However, the end result 
differs slightly from that of common law jurisdictions. Unlike 
common law jurisdictions, Louisiana has chosen to severely curtail 
the use of gross negligence in the context of punitive damages. 
However, it is still very much alive within the state in the context 
of immunities. 
A. Gross Negligence and Punitive Damages in Louisiana 
Prior to 1917, Louisiana took an approach to punitive damage 
that was identical to that of common law jurisdictions.130 Courts 
allowed recovery upon a showing of gross negligence, even though 
early versions of the Louisiana Civil Code contained no punitive 
damages provisions.131 Louisiana courts acknowledged the conflict 
between the state’s civilian heritage, which did not recognize 
punitive damages, and this approach.132 In Dirmeyer v. O’Hern, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court observed that punitive damages were 
                                                                                                             
 128. See discussion, supra Part II.B. 
 129. Id. 
 130. deGravelles, supra note 49, at 584–85. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Dirmeyer v. O’Hern, 3 So. 132, 134 (La. 1887). 
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borrowed from the common law133 and that Louisiana’s practice of 
granting this form of recovery was against the long-standing rule in 
civilian jurisdictions that the purpose of awarding damages was to 
repair the harm sustained by the victim, not to punish the conduct 
of the wrongdoer.134 In 1917, the Louisiana Supreme Court sought 
to rectify this discrepancy in Vincent v. Morgan’s Louisiana.135 
The court held that pecuniary penalties intended to punish the 
tortfeasor would no longer be recoverable in Louisiana unless 
expressly allowed by statute.136  
As a result of the Vincent decision, modern Louisiana law only 
allows recovery of punitive damages where expressly authorized 
by statute.137 The statutory basis for punitive damages can be 
found in the Civil Code, which provides instances where 
“exemplary” damages may be recoverable.138 The code allows 
recovery of exemplary damages for child pornography, intoxicated 
driving, and criminal sexual activity occurring during childhood.139 
Using the words “exemplary damages,” these Code articles allow 
recovery of punitive damages upon a showing that the damages 
were caused by a “wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and 
safety of others,”140 or gross negligence. If a plaintiff’s claim does 
not fall within one of these narrowly defined categories, punitive 
damages are unavailable, regardless of the depravity of the 
defendant’s conduct. 
                                                                                                             
 133. Id. 
 134. deGravelles, supra note 49, at 580. 
 135. 74 So. 541 (La. 1917). 
 136. See id. at 548. 
 137. See id. at 548-49. 
 138. See LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 2315.3 (2010); LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 
2315.4 (2010); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.7 (2010) (The legislature set forth 
three codal provisions outlining circumstances in which punitive or exemplary 
damages may be awarded: 1) Article 2315.3, additional damages for child 
pornography; 2) Article 2315.4, additional damages for intoxicated defendant; 
and 3) Article 2315.7, liability for damages caused by criminal sexual activity 
occurring when the victim was 17 years old or younger). 
 139. Id. 
 140. See id. 
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In Mosing v. Domas, a Louisiana court addressed the purpose 
of punitive damages in Louisiana: “[Punitive damages] . . . are 
given to the plaintiff over and above full compensation for his 
injuries, for the purpose of punishing the defendant, of teaching the 
defendant not to do it again, and of deterring others from following 
the defendant’s example.”141 
Following this line of reasoning, the Louisiana legislature 
enacted a limited set of laws detailing under what circumstances 
the defendant’s actions are sufficiently blameworthy to merit 
punitive damages.142 Each of Louisiana’s punitive damage 
provisions makes a textual reference to gross negligence; however, 
courts have moved away from requiring the plaintiff to make an 
actual showing of gross negligence.143 Instead, courts often 
presume that the defendant was grossly negligent if the plaintiff 
can establish certain facts and causation.144  
1. Gross Negligence and Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.4 
                                                                                                             
 141. Mosing v. Dumas, 798 So. 2d 1105, 1113 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2001) 
(citing Rivera v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 697 So. 2d 327 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 
1997)). 
 142. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.3 (2010); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 
2315.4 (2010); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 2315.7 (2010). 
 143. See Bourgeois v. State Farm, 562 So. 2d 1177, 1182 (La. Ct. App. 4th 
Cir. 1990) (“Several courts have . . . indicated that a presumption of recklessness 
can be made when the intoxication of the defendant is the cause in fact of the 
accident”); Myres v. Nunsett, 511 So. 2d 1287, 1289 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 
1987): 
A number of other states take the position that operating a motor 
vehicle on the public road after voluntary intoxication in and of itself 
constitutes sufficient reckless disregard to warrant an award of 
exemplary damages. Our codal article requires an additional showing 
that the accident resulting in injury was caused by the voluntary 
intoxication of a defendant;  
McDaniel v. DeJean, 556 So. 2d 1336, 1340 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (“[The 
defendant] acted with a wanton or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of 
others by getting intoxicated and driving . . . . We find the evidence 
preponderates that his intoxication was a cause in fact of the accident; therefore, 
the exemplary damage award was proper”). 
 144. See Bourgeois, 562 So. 2d at 1182 (a defendant’s gross negligence will 
be presumed upon a showing that the defendant was intoxicated and that his 
intoxication was a cause in fact of the plaintiffs’ injuries). 
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Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4 allows a plaintiff to 
recover punitive damages upon showing that his injuries were 
caused by the defendant’s gross negligence in operating a vehicle 
while intoxicated.145 The text of the article requires that the 
plaintiff prove the defendant was grossly negligent; however, in 
Bourgeois v. State Farm, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit stated that 
some Louisiana courts would presume recklessness upon a 
showing that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the defendant’s 
intoxication.146  
After consideration of the statutory requirements of 2315.4, the 
Bourgeois court broke the article down into the three elements that 
a plaintiff must establish in order to recover punitive damages.147 
These elements are: 1) that the defendant was intoxicated or had a 
“sufficient quantity of intoxicants to make him lose normal control 
of his mental and physical facilities;” 2) that the drinking was a 
cause in fact of the accident; and 3) that the injuries were caused 
by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of 
others.148 The court focused on the third element necessary for 
recovery—proof that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the 
defendant’s grossly negligent conduct.149 The court noted that 
many Louisiana courts employ a presumption of gross negligence 
if the intoxication of the defendant was a cause in fact of the 
plaintiff’s injuries.150 The court concluded that, while the Fourth 
Circuit generally required a separate showing of wanton and 
reckless disregard, most Louisiana courts would assume gross 
                                                                                                             
 145. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.4 (2010): 
In addition to general and special damages, exemplary damages may be 
awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were 
caused by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of 
others by a defendant whose intoxication while operating a motor 
vehicle was a cause in fact of the resulting injuries. 
 146. Bourgeois, 562 So. 2d at 1179–80. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 1180. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 1182. 
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negligence upon a showing that the defendant’s intoxication was to 
blame for the plaintiff’s injuries.151 
Following Bourgeois, the circuit courts split on what a plaintiff 
was required to prove to recover punitive damages under article 
2315.4.152 Some circuits maintained that a plaintiff was required to 
establish not only that the defendant was intoxicated and his 
intoxication was a cause in fact of his injuries, but also that the 
injuries were caused by the defendant’s wanton and reckless 
disregard for the safety of others. Other circuits believed that by 
proving that the defendant was intoxicated and his intoxication was 
the cause in fact of the injuries, the plaintiff had satisfied his 
burden. By taking the latter approach, courts have removed the 
burden on the plaintiff that required him to prove the defendant 
was grossly negligent when seeking punitive damages. The award 
of punitive damages is not truly predicated upon gross negligence 
in circumstances where there is obviously voluntary intoxication.  
2. Gross Negligence and Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.7 
The legislature enacted Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.7 to 
provide for damages suffered as a result of criminal sexual activity 
occurring while the victim was a minor and for “related 
matters.”153 Article 2315.7 allows for an award of punitive 
damages upon a showing that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused 
by a “wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety” of 
the plaintiff through criminal sexual conduct, which occurred 
while the plaintiff was seventeen years old or younger.154  
                                                                                                             
 151. Id. at 1184. 
 152. deGravelles, supra note 49, at 595. 
 153. 1993 La. Acts no. 831. 
 154. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.7 (2010): 
In addition to general and special damages, exemplary damages may be 
awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were 
caused by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of 
the person through criminal sexual activity which occurred when the 
victim was seventeen years old or younger, regardless of whether the 
 
 
238 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 6 
 
Louisiana state courts have had limited opportunity to interpret 
and apply article 2315.7. However, a federal court in Louisiana 
applied the article in Capdeboscq v. Francis.155 In Capdeboscq, the 
plaintiffs alleged that they had voluntarily posed topless for a 
photo after the defendants assured them that they would not appear 
in a Girls Gone Wild video.156 The plaintiffs complained that, even 
after they were assured they “had nothing to worry about,” they 
were featured on the cover of Girls Gone Wild: Doggy Style.157 
The plaintiffs sought punitive damages under article 2315.7.158 
The court, however, found that the plaintiffs had failed to state a 
basis upon which their claim could be predicated.159 The court held 
that, because the plaintiffs had failed to allege a violation of an 
applicable criminal statute, there was no basis for recovery under 
article 2315.7.160 The Capdeboscq court’s brief analysis provides 
little guidance on what constitutes gross negligence and grounds 
for recovery under the article.161 However, the court indicated that 
violation of a criminal statute dealing with sexual misconduct was 
necessary to allow a plaintiff to recover under article 2315.7.162  
If liability is predicated upon violation of a criminal statute, 
then recklessness will likely be presumed upon a showing that the 
defendant’s conduct violated the applicable criminal law. If this is 
true, then the plaintiff will not be required to make a separate 
showing of gross negligence to recover punitive damages.  
3. Gross Negligence and Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.3 
                                                                                                             
 
defendant was prosecuted for his or her acts. The provisions of this 
Article shall be applicable only to criminal sexual activity. 
 155. Capdeboscq v. Francis, CIV.A.03-0556, 2004 WL 463316 (E.D. La. 
Mar. 10, 2004). 
 156. Id. at 1. 
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 158. Capdeboscq v. Francis, CIV.A. 03-0556, 2003 WL 21418499 (E.D. La. 
June 16, 2003). 
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Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.3 allows for recovery of 
punitive damages if the plaintiff can establish that his injuries were 
caused by the defendant’s “wanton and reckless disregard . . . 
through an act of pornography involving juveniles as defined by 
R.S. 18:81.1.”163 The Louisiana legislature enacted article 2315.3 
in 2009 to allow the recovery of punitive damages by victims of 
child pornography, even if the person responsible for the damages 
was never criminally prosecuted.164 Louisiana courts have not yet 
had occasion to apply article 2315.3. Because the courts have not 
addressed punitive damages within the context of the child 
pornography article, there is no indication of whether this article 
will be interpreted to require a showing of gross negligence or if it 
will be presumed upon a showing that the defendant violated the 
state’s child pornography statute.165 However, given the 
construction of the article, it seems likely that to constitute wanton 
or reckless conduct, the defendant’s actions must, at the very least, 
violate the state’s juvenile pornography statute.166 
4. A Final Look at Louisiana’s Law on Gross Negligence and 
Punitive Damages167 
                                                                                                             
 163. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.3 (2010): 
In addition to general and special damages, exemplary damages may be 
awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were 
caused by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of 
the person through an act of pornography involving juveniles, as 
defined by R.S. 14:81.1, regardless of whether the defendant was 
prosecuted for his acts. 
 164. 2009 La. Acts no. 382.  
 165. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.1 (2012). 
 166. See id. 
 167. Louisiana also employs the Louisiana’s Drug Dealer Liability Act, 
which is the fourth and final punitive damages statute in use. The purpose of the 
Louisiana Drug Dealer Liability Act is to provide a civil remedy for damages to 
persons in a community injured by an individual’s use of illegal drugs by 
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marketing of illegal drugs to those who profit from the market, while at the same 
time deterring others from entering the market. The act allows certain categories 
of persons, injured by an individual’s use of an illegal controlled substance, to 
recover punitive damages. The statute allows for any persons injured as a result 
 
 
240 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 6 
 
Louisiana has chosen to severely curtail the availability of 
punitive damages under state law by restricting their availability to 
circumstances in which they are specifically authorized by statute, 
all of which require some form of criminal conduct. However, each 
provision authorizing punitive damages predicates recovery upon a 
finding that the defendant was grossly negligent. In many 
instances, the courts have interpreted these articles in such a way 
as to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of actually proving that the 
defendant was grossly negligent, voluntary criminal conduct 
presuming that the action was based on a wanton and reckless 
disregard for the victim’s safety or interest. This creates a situation 
similar to res ipsa loquitur where the court will presume 
negligence even without conclusive proof where justified by the 
circumstances.168  
B. Gross Negligence and Contributory Fault in Louisiana 
Prior to 1980, Louisiana employed a contributory negligence 
scheme169 similar to that in effect in the common law.170 Under 
this standard, any conduct on the part of the plaintiff that was a 
legally contributing factor to his injuries was sufficient to bar 
recovery.171 Louisiana adopted this system in Fleytas v. 
Pontchartrain Railroad Co., before there was an organized body of 
civilian doctrine on comparative fault.172 In 1980, the legislature 
                                                                                                             
 
of the individual user’s gross negligence to recover punitive damages. The 
plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that their injuries 
were caused by the use of illegal drugs; however, no further showing of gross 
negligence is necessary for recovery. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.61 
(2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.63 (2009); Kemp v. Metabolife Int’l., 
Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17770 (E.D. La. 2003). 
 168. See MARAIST, supra note 7, at § 8.06. 
 169. See Dumas v. State, 828 So.2d 530, 532-33 (La. 2002). 
 170. Id. See also discussion supra, Part III.B (on the common law rule of 
contributory fault as a bar to a plaintiff’s recovery). 
 171. Dumas, 828 So. 2d at 533. 
 172. Id., citing Fleytas v. Pontchartrain R. Co., 18 La. 339 (1841); Bell v. Jet 
Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 169 (La. 1985). 
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amended Louisiana Civil Code article 2323 to replace contributory 
negligence with a pure comparative fault scheme.173 Article 2323 
states that: 
If a person suffers injury, death, or loss as the result partly 
of his own negligence and partly of the fault of another 
person or persons, the amount of damages recoverable shall 
be reduced in proportion to the degree or percentage of 
negligence attributable to the person suffering the injury, 
death or loss.174 
The legislature chose to adopt a comparative standard to 
mitigate the harshness of the contributory negligence doctrine.175 
Rather than denying recovery outright if the plaintiff contributed to 
his injuries at all, the legislature adopted a pure comparative fault 
scheme that apportions liability in direct proportion to fault.176 
Under this scheme, if the plaintiff is ninety percent at fault in 
causing his or her injuries, he or she may still recover ten percent 
of the damages, the portion sustained due to the defendant’s 
fault.177 When Louisiana shifted from a contributory negligence to 
a comparative fault scheme, the application of the gross negligence 
standard within this context was severally curtailed because 
plaintiffs were no longer required to overcome contributory 
negligence as a bar to recovery.  
C. Gross Negligence and Immunities in Louisiana 
Immunities represent the predominant use of gross negligence 
in Louisiana. As in the common law, immunity statutes are 
intended to protect certain actors from liability when the legislature 
determines that their conduct is so beneficial to society that the 
value of their actions outweighs other societal interests that dictate 
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tortfeasors should compensate their victims.178 Louisiana adopted 
traditional immunity statutes including: governmental immunity; 
automotive guest statutes; recreational activity statutes; and Good 
Samaritan legislation.179 However, Louisiana also has immunity 
statutes that reflect its unique culture, including a statute limiting 
the liability of Mardi Gras krewes.180 In all, Louisiana has more 
than forty immunity statutes that cover a wide range of actors and 
generally raise the level of liability from negligence to gross 
negligence.181 
In Louisiana, immunity statutes are an affirmative defense to 
be pled by the actor after the tort has occurred.182 If the actor’s 
conduct is covered by the statute, he will escape liability where it 
would otherwise be imposed.183 Louisiana applies immunity 
statutes in essentially the same fashion as common law 
jurisdictions.184 The distinction, if any, lies in the actors that 
Louisiana chooses to protect and the number of immunities that 
have been enacted.185 
The immunity for Mardi Gras krewes is unique to Louisiana.186 
Mardi Gras parades are an important part of Louisiana’s culture 
and a major element of the state’s tourism industry. The legislature 
recognized the potential liability facing parade participants and 
                                                                                                             
 178. MARAIST, supra note 7, at § 11.01; see also discussion supra, Part III.B. 
 179. See CRAWFORD, supra note 24, at 833–37. 
 180. Id; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2796 (Supp. 2011). 
 181. See CRAWFORD, supra note 24, at 833–37. 
 182. MARAIST, supra note 7, at § 11.01. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See discussion supra Part III.C (Common law jurisdictions employ 
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society that the societal interest in protecting the actor is greater than the societal 
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gross negligence and allows an actor to escape liability). 
 185. See CRAWFORD, supra note 24, at 833–37 (Louisiana has over 40 
immunity statutes covering a span of actors from charities and money managers 
to Mardi Gras krewes). 
 186. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2796 (Supp. 2011). 
 
 
2013] FILLING THE GAPS 243 
 
enacted Louisiana Revised Statute Section 9:2796, which limits the 
liability of parade participants to gross negligence.187 
With this plethora of immunity statutes, gross negligence is 
very much alive in Louisiana. It allows a plaintiff to override the 
defense of immunity when proving the defendant’s gross 
negligence.  
V. COMPARING GROSS NEGLIGENCE IN LOUISIANA AND THE 
COMMON LAW 
Gross negligence can be used by plaintiffs to recover punitive 
damages and, when necessary, to overcome contributory 
negligence as a bar to recovery. It is also used in conjunction with 
immunity statutes to limit the scope of the defense to cases of 
simple negligence.188 Louisiana makes a nominal use of gross 
negligence in the context of punitive damages,189 and continues to 
employ the concept when dealing with immunities.190  
Louisiana and the common law diverge in the context of 
punitive damages. The common law will generally allow recovery 
of punitive damages in circumstances where the defendant was 
grossly negligent. In Louisiana, if the actor is negligent, the 
plaintiff will recover compensatory damages but nothing more, no 
matter how egregious the actor’s behavior, unless one of the state’s 
limited punitive damages provisions apply, requesting 
recklessness, though gross negligence can be presumed as these are 
situations of intentional criminal conduct. These divergent 
applications can lead to dramatically different results. 
                                                                                                             
 187. Id. 
 188. See supra Part III.C. 
 189. See supra Part IV.A (Louisiana has limited punitive damage awards to 
circumstances expressly outlined by the legislature through statute or code 
article. These statutes, as interpreted by the Louisiana judiciary, generally do not 
require a true showing of gross negligence. In many circumstances, the requisite 
mindset can be presumed upon proof of causation). 
 190. See supra Part IV.C (discussion of Louisiana’s use of gross negligence 
in conjunction with immunity statutes). 
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Louisiana’s decision to change from the traditional common 
law application of punitive damages was based largely on the 
state’s civilian heritage.191 Punitive damages were, and remain, 
largely rejected by the civilian jurisdictions of continental 
Europe.192 The refusal by the German Supreme Court to enforce in 
Germany an American court’s decision awarding a juvenile 
$400,000 in punitive damages on the basis that it was against 
public order is illustrative of the general European perspective.193 
Dr. Koziol discussed the general European distaste for punitive 
damages in his 2008 article, Punitive Damages—A European 
Perspective.194 Dr. Koziol’s discussion illuminates a number of the 
prevailing arguments against the award of punitive damages.195 
The primary concern is that the private law is neither geared 
towards nor equipped to punish actors for their wrongdoing.196 
Rather than stretching private law beyond its intended bounds, 
criminal law should be improved to meet any outstanding needs.197 
A number of American scholars have joined in the criticism of 
punitive damages.198 Consider Anthony Sebok’s attack of punitive 
                                                                                                             
 191. See, e.g., Dirmeyer v. O’Hern, 3 So. 132, 134 (La. 1887) (Where the 
Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the discrepancy between Louisiana’s 
approach to the application of punitive damages and traditional Civilian theory); 
Vincent v. Morgan’s Louisiana, 74 So. 541 (La. 1917) (where the Louisiana 
Supreme Court made the decision to limit the award of punitive damages to 
situations where they had been specifically authorized by statute); discussion 
supra Part IV. 
 192. Helmut Koziol, Punitive Damages—A European Perspective, 68 LA. L. 
REV. 741, 751 (2008). 
 193. Id. at 742. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 751–58. 
 196. Id. at 751–52, 763 (Dr. Koziol argues that the private law fails at 
adequately punishing and deterring blameworthy behavior because there is no 
corresponding relationship between the injury suffered by the plaintiff and the 
amount of recovery. He argues that punishing the defendant with punitive 
damages allows a windfall for the plaintiff who has suffered no corresponding 
injury. He goes on to say that, if the defendant is going to be held liable for 
punitive damages, the only way to justify their award is to place the damages 
that go beyond compensation into a public fund in such a way that they amount 
more to a fine than extra compensatory damages). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA 
L. REV. 957 (2007); Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment 
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damages in his article, Punitive Damages: From Myth to 
Theory.199 Professor Sebok concedes that punitive damages must 
have some deterrent effects, but argues that they fail as a 
mechanism of efficient deterrence because research suggests that 
juries produce awards that are neither certain nor likely to bear a 
reasonable relationship to the amount of money that incentivizes 
investment in appropriate safety measures.200 Yet another scholar, 
Dan B. Dobbs, argues that punitive damages are not subject to 
accurate measurement and therefore not subject to effective 
limits.201 Professor Dobbs goes on to discuss a number of other 
criticisms.202 In particular he argues that punishment should be 
reserved for criminal law and that allowing punitive damages 
could lead to an unfair application that may over-deter some 
conduct while under-deterring other conduct.203  
While it is true there are a number of arguments against 
punitive damages, they do serve an invaluable gap filling function 
in American law. Reconsider the factual scenario from the 
beginning of this article in which the seventy-seven year old man 
was allowed to suffer from an extremely painful condition while 
his caregivers took little to no action to alleviate his pain.204 Under 
the American legal regime, the caregivers’ actions fall outside the 
scope of criminal law, thus the only available remedy is in tort. 
Given the caregivers’ recognition of the condition, their failure to 
treat the condition, and their choice to allow the condition to 
progress to such a life-threatening level, it seems reasonable to 
                                                                                                             
 
Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 
MINN. L. REV. 583 (2003); Richard W. Wright, The Grounds and Extent of 
Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1425 (2003); Dan B. Dobbs, 
Ending Punishment in “Punitive” Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies, 
40 ALA. L. REV. 831 (1988). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 984. 
 201. Dobbs, supra note 198, at 834. 
 202. Id. at 837–39. 
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 204. See supra Part I.  
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conclude that the caregivers were grossly negligent.205 Because the 
actors were grossly negligent, the damages awarded to the patient 
depend upon the jurisdiction in which the suit is brought. Under 
the prevailing common law approach, the caregivers’ grossly 
negligent actions would allow the plaintiff to recover punitive 
damages.206 Had this case been brought before a court in 
Louisiana, no punitive damages would have been awarded because 
the factual scenario is not expressly provided for by the legislature. 
Under Louisiana law, the conduct would go undeterred and the 
defendants would escape any form of punishment.207 
The caregivers’ behavior was extremely blameworthy. They 
recognized that the patient was suffering from a minor bedsore that 
could have been easily treated; but rather than following the proper 
procedure to treat the condition, they allowed the bedsore to 
progress to a serious, life threatening condition.208 Is it right for 
these actors to escape punishment simply because their conduct 
falls through a gap between private and criminal law? Is this not 
the type of behavior that a state has a legitimate interest in 
deterring?  
The flexibility afforded by allowing the award of punitive 
damages upon a showing of gross negligence is what makes the 
common law approach so appealing. Under the common law 
system, punitive damages serve as a “gap-filler” that allows for the 
punishment and deterrence of blameworthy behavior, without 
                                                                                                             
 205. Gross negligence is an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of 
care. See supra Part I. 
 206. See id. This fact pattern was presented to a Texas Appellate Court in 
Convalescent Services, Inc. v. Schultz. 921 S.W.2d, 739–40 (Tex. App. 1996) 
(the Texas court determined that the caregivers’ actions were grossly negligent 
and upheld the trial court’s award of punitive damages).  
 207. See MARAIST, supra note 7, at § 7.02 (“Compensatory damages are 
divided into two broad categories: special and general damages.” Special 
damages are those that have a quantifiable value, general damages are those 
which are speculative in nature and include pain and suffering, mental anguish, 
and loss of enjoyment of life). 
 208. See Convalescent Services, 921 S.W.2d at 733. 
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requiring the legislature to pass specific legislation covering every 
conceivable scenario. 
The United States Supreme Court has declared that punitive 
damages are civil penalties intended to punish actors for 
extraordinarily blameworthy behavior and deter similar actions in 
the future, and that they are justified by a state’s legitimate interest 
in protecting its citizenry from extraordinarily blameworthy 
behavior.209 The Louisiana legislature recognized the value of civil 
punishment with its adoption of limited punitive damages statutes. 
However, because the legislature must enact a statute specifically 
authorizing punitive damages before they can be awarded, many 
actors whose behavior should be punished will escape retribution 
unless the legislature has expressly provided otherwise.  
The benefit of having punitive damages available to punish 
grossly negligent conduct is that they provide an extra tool for 
courts to employ when the circumstances merit punishment but fall 
outside the scope of criminal law. Louisiana should enact 
legislation allowing courts to grant punitive damages in case of 
gross negligence, similar to most common law sister states. Doing 
so places the responsibility of monitoring awards of punitive 
damages in the hands of the state’s judiciary, who would be 
responsible for gauging the blameworthiness of a defendant’s 
behavior and making a determination of whether his conduct is 
grossly negligent and merits punishment. Giving courts this ability 
would allow for punishment as merited by the circumstances 
without forcing the legislature to predict every possible scenario. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The common law applies a relatively balanced approach to its 
application of gross negligence, both in the context of punitive 
damages and immunities. Louisiana has essentially abandoned the 
component of gross negligence in the context of punitive damages, 
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but maintains its application in the context of immunities. 
Louisiana does not allow punitive damages for a showing of gross 
negligence unless specifically authorized by statute, Civil Code 
provisions to this effect being limited to cases of intentional 
criminal conduct. Louisiana’s approach to gross negligence and 
punitive damages leaves a gap between criminal and private law. 
By requiring the legislature to pre-legislate punitive damages 
recovery, Louisiana has eliminated the flexibility that makes the 
common law system so attractive. Allowing courts to impose 
punishment for grossly negligent behavior fills the void left 
between criminal law and private law. It allows the court to punish, 
and thereby deter, egregious behavior as it arises, rather than 
requiring the legislature to pass specific statutes governing every 
sort of action. It is impossible for the legislature to preconceive 
every blameworthy action before it occurs. The common law 
approach of allowing the judiciary leeway to assess punitive 
damages for grossly negligent behavior insures that blameworthy 
behavior is subject to some form of punishment, even if it is 
outside the scope of criminal law. Even European opponents to 
punitive damages, including Dr. Koziol, have recognized that 
European criminal law covers a broader swath of activity than the 
American counterpart,210 and therefore punitive damages may be 
necessary to fill voids in the law.  
Louisiana is a hybrid jurisdiction that employs a distinct 
version of the civil law, like few other legal systems in the world. 
This offers an opportunity to administer justice and punish grossly 
negligent actors who are guilty of conduct that goes far beyond the 
pale of reasonableness, while preventing the miscarriage of justice 
associated with grossly disproportionate punitive damage awards. 
The legislature could adopt a statutory scheme that allows the 
judiciary more freedom in applying punitive damages for grossly 
                                                                                                             
 210. Koziol, supra note 192, at 760 (Dr. Koziol points out that, in many 
situations, circumstances that would merit punitive damages under American 
law are punishable by criminal law in many European systems). 
 
 
2013] FILLING THE GAPS 249 
 
negligent actions, but which maintains a narrow enough scope to 
prevent the miscarriage of justice associated with disproportionate 
exemplary damage awards. 
 
 
 
